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This paper concerns the impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 
on Canadian Military Justice. My interest in this subject stems from my 
membership in the Canadian Armed Forces as a reserve armoured officer. I must 
add, however, that I have never practised military law, and have only rarely come 
in contact with this area of the law in my role as a reserve sub-unit commander. 
As a result, I speak strictly as a generalist and not as an authority on the subject.
Charter Impact on Military Law
The Charter has had a major impact on the Canadian legal system. It has 
provided Canadians with new and expanded rights. There has been significant 
jurisprudential modification and structural evolution over the past decade to bring 
Canadian law into conformity with the Charter. However, not all aspects of 
Canadian law have received the same degree of attention before the courts. 
Military law has been sitting on the sidelines for most of the past decade, probably 
wondering what kind of damage would be wrought when the tidal wave of Charter 
reform would finally and inevitably hit. Would the wave come ashore with 
hurricane-force winds destroying everything in its path, producing an immediate 
need for an extensive and urgent reconstruction package, or would Supreme Court 
of Canada decisions be like the storm that missed landfall, thereby causing only 
a ripple instead of a downpour?
I think it is fair to say that military lawyers and academics knew that change 
would come. But until the Supreme Court of Canada had a chance to examine 
the military justice system in light of the Charter, no one really knew what would 
be the nature and extent of the modification. Military lawyers were holding their 
breath and legal academics were rubbing their hands. Scholarly writing on this 
subject pointed to an apprehension within the military community as to the 
possible outcome.2 The ultimate fear was the possible dismantling of the military
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^art I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 
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2A. Heard, “Military Law and the Charter of Rights" [1988] Dalhousie L.J. at 514. This article sets the 
stage for the need for a considerable re-examination of military law in light of the Charter. It aptly 
describes the number and magnitude of apparent conflicts with the Charter and urges reform. It is 
also relevant because it deals with aspects of United States’ Military Law alluded to by Dean Zillman
justice system through a Charter-led “rivilianization” of the process. This, military 
lawyers suggested, would have had a very serious impact on military effectiveness 
and ultimately risk destroying the governance of military society itself. After ten 
years of Charter experience, it is only now that some of these issues are being dealt 
with by the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Charter and the Court-Martial
While the military justice system has two main litigation processes, court-martial 
and summary trial, only the former has been the subject of close scrutiny by the 
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Généreux* and its 
companion case R. v. Forster* examines, for the first time, the impact of the 
Charter on the court-martial process.
In these landmark decisions, the Court, to the relief of many within the 
military community, concluded that the military justice system, as it relates to 
court-martial, does not need a radical reform to permit it to comply with the 
Charter. This decision is consistent with the court’s traditional approach to the 
Charter and its impact on Canadian law. The Supreme Court of Canada has made 
it quite clear in the past that the Charter was not designed to stand the Canadian 
legal system on its end, nor to undermine the existence of organizations such as 
the Canadian Armed Forces or the RCMP.5 It was quite rightly thought, 
however, that organizations having internal justice systems, such as the Canadian 
Armed Forces and the RCMP, would put this approach to its most rigorous test.
Because of the patent conflicts which existed with the Charter, many military 
lawyers were unsure as to how the court would apply the Charter to the justice 
systems found in these organizations. They took solace from the fact that the 
drafters of the Charter recognized the importance of maintaining and enforcing the 
internal codes of discipline in these organizations. Explicit reference is made to 
the system of military tribunals in s. 11 of the Charter.6 This led many military
in his presentation during the Viscount Bennett Symposium.
3[1992] 1 S.C.R. 259 [hereinafter Généreux].
4[1992] 1 S.C.R. 339 [hereinafter former].
SR. v. Wigglesworth [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541.
6Supra,, note 1 at s. 11(f). This sub-section provides a recognition that military justice and its 
uniqueness can co-exist with the Charter guarantees. Section 11(f) states that any person charged with 
an offence has the right, except in the case of an offence under military law tried before a military 
tribunal, to the benefit of trial by jury when the maximum punishment for the offence is imprisonment 
for five years or a more severe punishment.
jurists to conclude that the drafters envisaged an accommodation between the 
Charter and military law.
The objective of avoiding upheaval to the military justice system is emphasized 
clearly in the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Généreux1 The 
question for decision was whether s. 11 of the Charter was applicable to the 
General Court-Martial, or was a General Court-Martial an infringement of s. 
11(d), and if so, whether the infringement was justifiable under s. 1 of the Charter.
In its inquiry, the court had to decide whether the General Court-Martial was 
an independent and impartial tribunal.8 In other words, is the court-martial 
process legitimate, and can it continue to be an integral part of the military justice 
system in light of the Charter?
The Supreme Court of Canada in Généreux clearly and unequivocally provided 
for the applicability of the Charter to military justice and certainly to the court- 
martial component of the system. While the court accepted modifications which 
would bring the court-martial process into conformity with the Charter, the court 
did not go as far as to advocate wholesale change. The court went to great length 
to reassure the military that its justice system could co-exist with the civilian 
system, and that the military need not fear a major “civilianization” of military law. 
It concluded that the Charter applied to military law, and that its system was not 
inconsistent with the Charter. For example, the court stated that an accused’s right 
to an impartial and independent hearing must be interpreted in light of the fact 
that military justice is deeply entrenched in Canadian history, and its existence 
supported by “compelling principles.”
The Supreme Court also indicated that an accused’s right to a fair trial before 
an independent and impartial tribunal must be interpreted within the military 
context. The court accepted that this right may well be different in the military 
situation, as compared to a civilian situation. These conclusions indicate that the 
court accepts the social and military justification for an alternate system of justice 
coupled with alternate standards. The court, however, stressed that this process 
must take into account the principles of the Charter and find ways to accommodate
7This case involved a corporal in the Canadian Armed Forces who was charged with possession of 
narcotics for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 4 of the Narcotic Control Act and desertion 
under the National Defence Act. The accused was tried and convicted by a General Court-Martial. 
An appeal was heard and dismissed by the Court Martial Appeal Court. An appeal was made to the 
Supreme Court of Canada.
sSupra, note 1 at s. 11(d). Any person charged with an offence has the right to be presumed innocent 
until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal.
its guarantees. In Généreux, the Supreme Court concluded that these guarantees 
were not respected. The court-martial process which existed at the time of trial 
was deemed to offend the Charter in that the method of selecting the trier of fact 
did not guarantee independence and impartiality. The court went on to say, 
however, that the modifications to the court-martial procedure introduced since 
the trial would have complied with the Charter had they been in place at the time 
of the trial. The issue is whether these modifications amounted to “tinkering” 
with the system or major surgery.9
The court said that in order to meet the criteria of independence and 
impartiality imposed by the Charter, the military justice system must respect the 
principles set out in the case of Valente v. the Queen.10 The system must ensure 
an impartial and independent decision maker by providing for tenure, financial 
security and institutional independence. While the court stressed these 
requirements, it accepted that they may be complied with in a manner different 
than one would expect in a civilian court setting. For example, with respect to 
tenure, the court stressed that the independent tribunal be appointed for a fixed 
term. Because Canadian military law employed a process whereby the presiding 
officer at a court-martial was appointed on a case by case basis, the court 
concluded that this selection process did not amount to sufficient independence.
The court accepted the recent modification, which stipulated that a hearing 
officer or military lawyer be appointed to act as a military judge for a two to four
9Changes were introduced in January 1991 in an attempt to deal with these issues. Amendments to 
the Canadian Forces Queens Regulations and Orders were designed to have the court-martial process 
meet the criteria of the Charter. QR&O art. 4.09 states (1) Every officer who performs any of the 
following judicial duties shall be posted to a military trial judge position established within the Office 
of the Judge Advocate General: (a) Judge advocate of a General Court Martial or a Disciplinary 
Court Martial, (b) president of Standing Court Martial, (c) presiding judge of a Special General Court 
Martial. (2) Every posting to a position referred to in paragraph (1) shall be for a fixed term. (3) 
The fixed term under paragraph (2) shall normally be four years and shall not be less than two years. 
(4) No officer posted to a position referred to in paragraph (1) shall perform, or be directed to 
perform, duties other than the duties associated with that position. (5) An officer is eligible to be 
posted again to a position referred to in paragraph (1) on the expiration of any first or subsequent 
term (a) in the case of the Chief Military Trial Judge, upon the recommendation of the Judge 
Advocate General, and (b) in any other case, upon the recommendation of the Chief Military Trial 
Judge. (6) The posting of an officer to a position referred to in paragraph (1) may only be terminated 
prior to the expiration of its fixed term upon (a) the written request of the officer, (b) the officer’s 
acceptance of a promotion, (c) commencement of retirement leave prior to a release under Item 4 
(Voluntary) or Item 5(a) (Service Completed, Retirement Age) of the table to article 15.01 (Release 
of Officers and Non-commissioned Members), or (d) direction by the Minister, under paragraph (10) 
of article 101.16 (Conduct of Inquiry), that the officer be removed from the performance of judicial 
duties.
10Valente v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 673. This case set out the issue and principles relating to the 
independence of the judiciary. The Supreme Court of Canada discussed this issue in a case involving 
the Provincial Court Judiciary.
year term. Although one might consider this as an absolute minimum for the 
independence requirement, in the context of the Valente case, the court indicated 
that the modification would respond adequately to the Charter requirement in a 
military situation. The issue of financial security had to be complied with as well. 
However, within the military justice system there was no provision for financial 
security other than the military judge continuing to receive his or her salary, while 
conducting a court-martial, at a level commensurate with the rank held by that 
person. This provision, according to the court, was not sufficient protection to 
allow a military judge to arrive at a decision, which some might consider 
unfavourable, without fear of losing his or her appointment, rank and benefits. 
Some guarantee of maintenance of remuneration throughout the term of the 
appointment had to be established.
The court concluded that the new provision in the regulations was an 
acceptable form of financial security.11 The provision prohibited the performance 
of an officer, while acting as a military judge, from being used to determine his or 
her qualifications for a later promotion. Ultimately, this new provision guaranteed 
the military judge full pay and benefits for the rank held during the course of his 
or her appointment.
With respect to institutional independence, the court stressed that 
administrative issues, such as court lists, assignment of cases, and appointment of 
judges must be independent of the executive power. In the military, the executive 
power is considered to be the chain of command. As a result, the appointment 
of a military judge, the determination of case lists, and the assignment of cases 
must be done outside the chain of command applicable to the accused. Therefore, 
appointment of a military judge by the command process is not acceptable under 
the Charter. A process similar to the civilian court system has been implemented; 
all such administrative matters are now determined by the military judiciary 
independent of all other factors. For example, the court accepted the recent 
modification to the Queen’s Regulations and Orders found in article 111.22 which 
provides authority for the chief military judge to appoint a judge, from a pool of 
military judges, to preside at a court-martial. While these steps appear to be the 
minimum required under the Charter, it is clear that the court accepted these
nThe new provisions in the Queens Regulations and Orders relating to financial security are not so 
much based on the financial aspect, but rather on promotional security and a fixed term of office (see 
QR&O 26.10 & 26.11). Remuneration in the military is based chiefly on rank coupled with seniority 
benefits for time in rank. The new modifications to the Queen’s Regulations and Orders for the 
Canadian Forces provide that the performance of an officer as a military judge, as it relates to his or 
her judicial functions, cannot be used to determine qualification for promotion, (see QR&O 26.10 and 
26.11).
modifications as sufficient to satisfy the criteria of independence and impartiality.
One has to ask whether the court will accept these provisions as the minimum 
or if it will require further expansion of them in the future. In an appropriate case 
the court might require more. Clearly, there were members of the court who 
would have preferred a completely independent military tribunal.12 While this 
may be the ideal, those judges were not prepared to proceed that far at this 
point.13
The court followed the reasoning in the pre-Charter decision of the Supreme 
Court of Canada in MacKay v. the Queen.14 In that case, the majority concluded 
that in criminal prosecutions involving military personnel, a system of justice 
independent of the military establishment was not necessary. Chief Justice Laskin, 
in his dissent, expressed the view that such an independent system was preferable. 
In light of the support from a number of judges for the concept of a greater 
degree of independence for military tribunals, it is interesting to speculate as to 
the nature and structure of such a tribunal. Were these judges thinking of a fully 
independent tribunal for a court-martial? It is suggested that a military tribunal, 
staffed with a cadre of professional military judges appointed from the military 
justice establishment as a career position, would better serve the criteria of 
independence and impartiality. The process could very easily parallel the civilian 
structure already in place but remain in the military tradition.
The appointment of the military judges would be similar to appointments 
made under the s. 96 federal appointment power, and reserved for those military 
officers who have, as military lawyers, achieved sufficient experience and 
professional standing to prepare them to become members of a full-time military 
judiciary for the remainder of their career. The military tribunal could, for 
example, become the military division of the Federal Court of Canada with judges 
appointed to that division as full members of that court. This element is not 
unlike certain parts of the military justice system found in the United States.
There would be many advantages to such a structure. Military tribunals would 
have a greater degree of independence and impartiality, thereby ending any 
question of apprehension of bias, which some perceive as remaining within the 
current system regardless of the new provisions.15 This proposed appointment
12La Forest, McLachlin & Stevenson JJ.
13Supra, note 3 at 317.
14MacKay v. the Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 673.
^It is interesting to note the paradoxical approach taken with respect to the permanency of 
appointments for military judges in the United States and Canada. In the American system, an 
appointment as a military judge is far more permanent and long term than the limited or temporary
process is worth considering. At the very least, it would receive the approval of 
a significant number of Supreme Court judges and may be the approach the court 
would take at some future point. For the present, however, it appears that the 
court will not alter the court-martial system, but will require modification to 
ensure it “accommodates” the Charter.
It is also clear that some of these modifications need not be extensive. A 
major re-drafting or restructuring of the court-martial system in the short term is 
unlikely. Change will accrue incrementally as various courts deal with individual 
issues and features of the system on a case by case basis.
The Charter and the Summary Trial
Whether the same can be said for the summary trial component of the military 
justice system is far less certain. There are not, as yet, decisions which suggest 
how a court might decide the constitutionality of the summary trial process in light 
of the Charter. There is no question that the most common form of military trial 
is the summary trial process, but it is a process that is in direct conflict with the 
Charter on a number of fronts.
Because of the role and use of the military summary trial process, it is highly 
unlikely that mere “tinkering” would allow it to accommodate the Charter or to 
escape its impact.16 Summary trials appear to fail the test set out in Valente and 
endorsed in Généreux because of the absence of any element of tenure, 
independence or financial security in its procedure. Historically, the process went 
as far as denying an accused the right to legal counsel. The current procedure 
gives the officer conducting the summary trial discretion to allow representation 
by legal counsel.17 Some authors have strongly criticized the lack of
approach provided for under the Canadian system. The American approach is not unlike that of a 
Canadian civilian federal judicial appointment while the Canadian approach is not unlike some state 
and local judicial appointment procedures found in the United States.
16For a discussion of the nature and role of the summary trial process and its obvious conflicts with 
the Charter, see Heard, supra, note 2.
17Article 108.03 Queen’s Regulations and Orders. The October 1986 amendment made provision to 
allow occasional appearance of legal counsel as an option. Section 8(b) of art. 108.03 states that an 
accused has the right to be represented by legal counsel at a court martial but not at a summary trial, 
however, the assisting officer would assist the accused in preparing his case and presenting it at a 
summary trial; Notes (C) and (D) to art. 108.03 clarify the issue. Note (C) states: An accused person 
does not have a right to be represented by legal counsel at a summary trial. However, if an accused 
requests such representation, the officer conducting the summary trial has the discretion to (i) permit 
representation by legal counsel; (ii) proceed without representation by legal counsel; or (iii) apply for 
disposal of the charges against the accused by a court martial. Note (D) states: In the exercise of his 
discretion under Note (C), the officer conducting a summary trial should consider at least the
independence and impartiality that exists within the summary trial process. David 
Corry, in his article entitled “Military Law Under the Charter” provides nothing 
short of a total condemnation of the summary trial process when he states:
In conclusion, in spite of the integrity of the officers in the Canadian Forces, the 
summary trial process is far from being fair, independent, and impartial. Given the 
conflict of duties, Solomon himself could not possibly maintain the degree of 
impartiality that is necessary to render a just judgment at the summary trial.18
Be that as it may, there is some evidence to suggest that the Supreme Court 
of Canada may uphold the summary trial process with some modification. It is 
clearly the most common application of military law and very important to the 
governance of a military society. This fact may be its saving grace.
The summary trial process, from an operational point of view, is so 
fundamental to the military system that, quite possibly, a military society could not 
govern itself without it. It is the crucial structure upon which the discipline of 
military society is based. Historically, in the United States and Canada, courts 
have tended to characterize the summary trial as more of a disciplinary procedure 
than a criminal proceeding. The Supreme Court of Canada, when faced with the 
question of the constitutionality of the summary trial process, could very well use 
this “window*’ to allow it to survive. If this were to take place, modifications 
would be required to ensure its use as a purely disciplinary procedure and nothing 
more.
The United States Supreme Court followed this approach in Middendorf v. 
Henry19 and upheld the summary trial on the basis that the procedure was enough 
of a departure from a civilian criminal proceeding to dispense with constitutional 
protections, notwithstanding the imposition of military penalties. It was an attempt 
to distance the process from a criminal proceeding which would necessarily invoke 
strict constitutional guarantees. This approach suggests that if the summary trial 
process were limited to non-criminal matters, its constitutionality and compatibility 
with the Charter would be confirmed. This proposed jurisdiction may be the only 
way to preserve the summary trial process.
While the viability of the summary trial process has not been dealt with by the 
Supreme Court of Canada, it was considered by the Court-Martial Appeal Court
following (i) the nature of the offence; (ii) the complexity of the offence; (iii) the interest of justice; 
(iv) the interest of the accused; and (v) the exigencies of the service. An Officer conducting a 
summary trial who is considering the exercise of this discretion to permit representation by legal 
counsel should consult with a representative of the Judge Advocate General.
18D. Corry, (1987) 70 Osgoode Hall LJ. 67.
19(1975), 425 U.S. 25.
in the case of R. v. Robertson.20 This was a summary trial situation which 
involved a request pursuant to s. 10(b) of the Charter for the right to civilian 
counsel. This request had been denied by the commanding officer of the accused. 
The Court-Martial Appeal Court held that s. 10(b) of the Charter was not 
applicable to summary trial proceedings. In the court’s opinion, the right to 
counsel provided by the Charter applied only in respect to loss of liberty through 
arrest or detention itself, or for certain penalties similar to sanctions imposed by 
a civilian court in a regular criminal matter.
Whether or not military remedies, such as open or closed custody, or 
confinement to base or barracks, would attract the protection of the Charter is very 
open to question. A more fundamental issue involves a consideration of the 
notion that summary trials would be unaffected by the Charter if the process was 
strictly considered a disciplinary tool, as opposed to one providing for the 
determination of criminality, or one providing for the imposition of “true penal 
consequences” for an offence.
This would have significant consequences for the Code of Service Discipline21 
because it deals with military offences and criminal law, and reaches beyond 
military personnel. The Charter may require that all offences within the Code of 
Service Discipline, punishable by incarceration of a purely penal nature, be dealt 
with solely through the court-martial process, as opposed to the summary trial 
process. The same would be true for non-military personnel who may be charged 
with a summary trial offence. Such offences would have to be transferred out of 
the realm of the summary trial and into that of the court-martial.
In Robertson, the court followed historical convention and characterized the 
summary trial as a discipline procedure rather than a criminal proceeding. It is 
clear, however, that this will be the starting point of the debate. Corry in his 
article,22 criticizes this distinction. He argues that because military discipline has 
the ability to order various types of confinement, it will inevitably collide with the 
Charter protection and subject the process to Charter applicability.
Taken to the extreme, the argument suggests that all disciplinary matters 
involving any type of confinement would invoke the Charter. An alternative view 
is that the Charter applies only to those prohibitions that are purely criminal in 
nature, and necessarily involve incarceration or the imposition of true penal 
consequences. Whether or not the Supreme Court of Canada would uphold this 
latter view is not clear. There is an indication in Généreux that the court accepts
^(1983), 9 C.C.C. (3d) 404 (C.MA.C.) [hereinafter Robertson].
2lNational Defence Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. N-5, parts IV-IX [hereinafter Code of Service Discipline].
22Supra, note 18.
two functions within the Code of Service Discipline. Chief Justice Lamer states:
Although the Code o f Service Discipline is primarily concerned with maintaining 
discipline and integrity in the Canadian Armed Forces, it does not serve merely to 
regulate conduct that undermines such discipline and integrity. The code serves a 
public function as well by punishing specific conduct which threatens the public order 
and welfare [emphasis added].23
One of the reasons the Charter applied in the Généreux case was the 
possibility of the imposition of a term of imprisonment. The Cheater applied “by 
virtue of the potential imposition of true penal consequences.”24 One can 
conclude that if the Code of Service Discipline provided for a sanction involving 
“true penal consequences” to a purely military offence, as opposed to a purely 
criminal one, the Charter would also apply.
If this is true, the only way to insulate the summary process component of the 
military justice system would be to ensure that the punishment for the summary 
trial offence would not include a sanction amounting to “true penal 
consequences.”25 This reinforces the need for the transfer of all summary trial 
offences involving “true penal consequences” to the court-martial process in order 
to avoid collision with the Charter.
Precisely how the court will deal with the impact of the Charter on the 
summary trial is far from clear. The summary trial process may need to be 
realigned to ensure that it is confined to a purely disciplinary procedure, relating 
to military offences involving military personnel, with sanctions that do not include 
“true penal consequences” in the strictest sense of the term.26 All other offences 
would have to be dealt with through the court-martial process, or some other 
mechanism to be developed for this purpose. It is clear that in order to survive, 
the summary trial will have to be the subject of considerable thought and 
reassessment.
23Supra, note 3 at 281.
MSupra note 3 at 282.
2SThere are other distinctions that can be used as well. The article by Corry, supra, note 18, deals 
with some of these points.
26A literal interpretation of the term “true penal consequences” would entail a full loss of liberty 
through incarceration in a military prison or jail. It is not yet known whether the Supreme Court of 
Canada would accept something less than this definition. The military uses other forms of restricted 
activity as sanctions within its justice system. These can include open arrest, which is arrest and 
detention without confinement or closed arrest which might include restrictions on activity such as 
confinement to base or barracks. These forms of detention for Summary Trial Offences might be 
more palatable to the court as a military necessity and not considered as “true penal consequences” 
thereby not attracting the Charter.
The American Experience
As military lawyers and academics in Canada search for the answers to these 
questions, an examination of the American experience may prove helpful. Keep 
in mind that the Canadian and American military justice systems bear striking 
resemblances to each other, as do their civilian justice counterparts. The 
American system has had far more experience with the impact of constitutional 
rights legislation on military justice. This is true, both in terms of the length of 
time with which it has had to deal with this issue, as well as the number of court 
challenges generated by the size of its armed forces.
The military justice system of the United States was the subject of a major 
restructuring in 1968 to accommodate the emergence of individual rights as a 
result of constitutional legislation. For example, the issue of impartiality surfaced 
early on, and was dealt with by the new Uniform Code of Military Justice.27 The 
comment of Zillman identifies a significant change in philosophy:
A major change from old codes to the new UCMJ was the lessening of the criminal 
justice system as an instrument of military command ... The Uniform Code of 
Military Justice and its amendments in 1968 created a model that moved in the 
direction of greater rights to the accused’s individual rights at the expense of 
command control.28
The scope and the application of American military law were progressively 
limited by decisions in the 1950s and 1960s. However, since 1970, the United 
States Supreme Court has rendered a number of decisions that have upheld the 
precedence of military interests over civil rights.29 The court has recognized the 
role and importance of the military and the fundamental necessity of preserving 
the military system. It has established a body of case law in which:
... the notion of military necessity has been given very wide application in justifying 
infringements of civil rights by the military.30
Canadian courts could rely on the reasoning of these decisions. This approach 
seems to have been adopted in the Généreux case with respect to the court-martial 
process. The same approach could be applied to the summary trial process. 
However, the decisions have also tended to narrow the focus of American military 
law to military personnel.31 The Canadian Code of Service Discipline goes beyond
*10 U.S.C. § 801-94 (1992) [hereinafter UCMJ].
28Zillman, supra, note 2.
^Heard, supra, note 2 at 542.
3®Ibid. at 543.
31Canadian Military law has not become this restricted. Civilians who violate the Code of Service 
Discipline are subject to its provisions and can be prosecuted before military tribunals.
this point and is more inclusive. Some might argue it is too broad and constitutes 
an incursion into mainstream Canadian society.
Conclusion
I agree with Blair when he opines that military justice and military efficiency are 
not contradictory.32 As a process and as a structure, Canadian military justice is 
capable of being exercised in a qualitative manner. Commanders today are well- 
educated and sensitized to social issues, human rights and geo-politics. They are 
fair and try to provide the social and human support troops require in order to be 
an effective military force. It is no accident that the Canadian Armed Forces are 
regarded among the best of the world’s peacekeeping forces, and are currently 
performing this role in many corners of the world. Regardless of the quality of 
the Forces, there is still the requirement for a military justice system to dispense 
real justice and to be seen to do so. Most military jurists seem to accept the 
military law structure as it is and attempt to defend it as being one that works. 
The Canadian Military Justice System has been slow to react to the Charter, and 
appears only to do so when prodded by one court decision or another.
There does not appear to be a great deal of leadership, creative thinking or 
innovation coming from military jurists in response to the implications of the 
Charter at a time when most scholarly writing on the subject suggests that the 
Charter implications are quite significant.
Is the Généreux case the beginning or the end of Charter consideration of 
military justice issues? What is the impact of the Charter on the summary trial 
process? Will the Canadian Military Justice System acquire a fully independent 
judiciary composed of professional judges, either civilian or military, as some 
jurists prefer.33
In light of Généreux, it is clear that the Supreme Court of Canada will strive 
to maintain military society and the values on which its justice system is based. 
However, the court may follow the lead of its American counterpart, and restrict 
military law to a purely military offence involving military personnel.
32“Military Efficiency and Military Justice: Peaceful Co-Existence?” 42 U.N.B.L.J. 237.
33D. Zillman interestingly points out the United States Court of Military Appeals created by the 
UCMJ (see UCMJ Art.67,10 U.S.C. s. 867) by statute requires the members of the Court of Military 
Appeals to be civilians and not uniformed members. This is support for the principle that matters 
criminal in nature do not have to be tried by a military officer as judge, but could be done by any 
civilian court. This view would probably be supported by La Forest, McLachlin, Stevenson JJ. as per 
their opinions in the Généreux case and Laskin C.J. in the McKay case who appear to subscribe to the 
notion that a violation of the Criminal Code no matter where effected, military base or otherwise, is 
an offence against the State which should be dealt with similarly in all circumstances.
It is expected that the court will force the military justice system to become 
more focused. It will permit a Charter infringement only in those circumstances 
where there is a clear military nexus and military necessity. The court will also 
insist that modifications and mechanisms be employed to make the military justice 
system as compatible as possible with the Charter. However, it is clear that the 
Supreme Court of Canada will not proceed to the point where the military would 
lose control of its society and the values upon which it is built. The court will not 
impose broad civilian values on the military justice system. Généreux has seen to 
that.
